Extensive-form game

Results: 193



#Item
111Decision theory / Markov chain / Nash equilibrium / Bargaining problem / Extensive-form game / Markov perfect equilibrium / Trembling hand perfect equilibrium / Solution concept / Subgame / Game theory / Problem solving / Statistics

Markov Perfect Equilibrium in a Stochastic Bargaining Model Branislav L. Slantchev∗ Department of Political Science University of California, San Diego November 30, 2002

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Source URL: www.nyu.edu

Language: English - Date: 2012-08-21 10:11:50
112Problem solving / Extensive-form game / Nash equilibrium / Strategy / Complete information / Risk-neutral measure / Normal-form game / Expected value / Bayesian game / Game theory / Gaming / Decision theory

GAMES WITH INCOMPLETE INFORMATION Nobel Lecture, December 9, 1994 by JOHN C . HA R S A N Y I Haas School of Business, University of California, Berkeley, USA

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Source URL: www.nobelprize.org

Language: English - Date: 2013-10-18 06:44:56
113Subgame / Solution concept / Trembling hand perfect equilibrium / Extensive-form game / Strategy / Normal-form game / Best response / Nash equilibrium / Bayesian game / Game theory / Problem solving / Economics

MULTISTAGE GAME MODELS AND DELAY SUPERGAMES Nobel Lecture, December 9, 1994 by REINHARD SELTEN, BONN Rheinische Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität, Bonn, Germany

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Source URL: www.nobelprize.org

Language: English - Date: 2013-10-18 06:45:00
114Gaming / Bayesian game / Cooperative game / Bargaining problem / Nash equilibrium / Extensive-form game / Zero–sum game / Minimax / Repeated game / Game theory / Problem solving / Decision theory

Evanston, IL[removed]USA 580 Leverone Hall 2001 Sheridan Road Northwestern University

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Source URL: federation.ens.fr

Language: English - Date: 2012-09-26 07:59:54
115Self-confirming equilibrium / Nash equilibrium / Bayesian game / Extensive-form game / Strategy / Solution concept / Strategic dominance / Best response / The Intuitive Criterion / Game theory / Problem solving / Economics

Learning to Play Bayesian Games1 Eddie Dekel, Drew Fudenberg and David K. Levine2 First draft: December 23, 1996 Current revision: July 22, 2002 Abstract

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Source URL: levine.sscnet.ucla.edu

Language: English - Date: 2003-11-04 12:28:39
116Science / Centipede game / Ultimatum game / Altruism / Nash equilibrium / Subgame perfect equilibrium / Subgame / Extensive-form game / Bargaining / Game theory / Problem solving / Economics

Modeling Altruism and Spitefulness in Experiments1 David K. Levine2 October 26, 1995 revised October 17, 1997 Abstract: We examine a simple theory of altruism in which players payoffs are linear in

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Source URL: levine.sscnet.ucla.edu

Language: English - Date: 1997-10-17 20:01:40
117Nash equilibrium / Subgame / Strategy / Information set / Bayesian game / Game theory / Extensive-form game / Solution concept

Superstition and Rational Learning1 Drew Fudenberg and David K. Levine2 This version: [removed]First version: [removed]Abstract: We argue that some but not all superstitions can persist when learning is rational and players

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Source URL: levine.sscnet.ucla.edu

Language: English - Date: 2005-07-18 17:35:40
118Nash equilibrium / Extensive-form game / Centipede game / Solution concept / Outcome / Strategy / Determinacy / Normal-form game / Best response / Game theory / Problem solving / Self-confirming equilibrium

MEASURING PLAYERS’ LOSSES IN EXPERIMENTAL GAMES* Drew Fudenberg and David K. Levine October 7, 1996

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Source URL: levine.sscnet.ucla.edu

Language: English - Date: 1996-12-07 20:22:50
119Solution concept / Nash equilibrium / Outcome / Rationalizability / Normal-form game / Strategic dominance / Strategy / Trembling hand perfect equilibrium / Information set / Game theory / Extensive-form game / Self-confirming equilibrium

Payoff Information and Self-Confirming Equilibrium1 First version: April 25, 1995 This revision: July 12, 1999 Eddie Dekel

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Source URL: levine.sscnet.ucla.edu

Language: English - Date: 1999-07-12 13:09:31
120Nash equilibrium / Outcome / Best response / Normal-form game / Repeated game / Strategy / Bayesian game / Risk dominance / Game theory / Problem solving / Extensive-form game

When is Reputation Bad?1 Jeffrey Ely Drew Fudenberg David K. Levine2 First Version: April 22, 2002 This Version: November 20, 2005

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Source URL: levine.sscnet.ucla.edu

Language: English - Date: 2005-11-21 14:01:27
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